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INTRODUCTION
The integration of US political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. effectively summed this up with the following statement:
As we fight the global war on terror, we face a determined, adaptive and ruthless enemy. Since this war began, President Bush and other senior leaders have repeatedly said that to preserve our freedom in the face of such an enemy, we must use all the instruments of our national power, such as diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement and military elements. Given this committee's particular focus on our armed forces, we would add that this effort cannot involve only, or even primarily, America's military services. Simply put, the fronts of engagement are so vast, no one agency can fight this war alone. So it follows that to effectively employ all of America's instruments of national power, the organizations involved, from Cabinet agencies to other non-Defense agencies, must collaborate and cooperate as seamlessly as possible.
Representative Weldon sets lofty conditions to be successful in the GWOT, but he frames the problem efficiently. Why, for all the ability and influence wielded by the nation and with the incredible prosperity enjoyed by the population, are the executive departments of the US government unable to coordinate their activities in such a way as to harness the power of their country? It is clear that they must and that success depends on the full integration of all the departments.
Problem Background and Significance
As the world has become a more complex place, so too have the challenges of coordinating the actions of one nation, relative to others. One need only look as far as the GWOT operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to see the implications inherent in worldwide US government actions. The problem is that no one sees the world the same way. There are no fewer than four different models currently in use by the Department of State (DOS), The Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Counsel (NSC). This inevitably leads to confusion and inefficiency in the interagency process. To accomplish their mission of worldwide implementation of US foreign policy, both DOD and DOS divide the world into different subsets. These subsets delegate the responsibility for action and policy development. The DOD refers to these subsets as Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and the DOS calls them Bureaus. The DOD further defines the entire program regarding the management of COCOM boundaries and responsibilities as the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the word unified relating to the joint, or multiservice, nature of these areas of responsibility. Similarly, the DOS intends the Bureaus to coordinate the conduct of US foreign relations within their areas of responsibility. 4 In both DOD and DOS, the COCOM or Bureau is the major player in the implementation of national policy and goals. be of primary importance. This is, unfortunately, not the case. In neither department is major consideration given to synchronization for both internal and external issues. The executive departments of the US government have spent considerable time and effort over the last sixty years to relate their internal organizations to national policy, world events, emerging capabilities, requirements, and internal political considerations. Almost no effort has been made to relate those organizations to the departments on their left and right at the Cabinet table. One great example of DOD and DOS de-synchronization in the GWOT is in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Technically part of the DOD Central Command Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR), the HOA is home to a sub-unified Joint Task Force (JTF) responsible for coordinating counterterrorism activities in that part of the world, particularly those involving smuggling onto or from the Arabian peninsula. JTF HOA is an excellent example of the success of DOD transformation, through the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, in that JTF HOA has had representatives of all four services in its staff and leadership from its inception and has always functioned effectively. The challenge comes when the DOS is considered. The DOS African Affairs Bureau has an area of responsibility that encompasses the African continent, south of the Saharan desert. This includes the island nation of Madagascar and the lesser islands off the Eastern coast of Africa. The DOD defines this region much differently. The DOD defines the African continent into two pieces, with the eastern islands considered a separate, third, area.
Rather than use the Saharan desert as the dividing line, the DOD boundaries run from Southeast to Northwest, dividing the HOA region from greater Africa. Additionally, as the headquarters of the different DOD organizations responsible for this area span the globe from Tampa, Florida to Stuttgart Germany; to Camp Smith, Hawaii, the problems of coordination on that large a scale are significant. Consider the implications of this de-synchronization. For the Director of the Eastern Africa Department of the Bureau of African Affairs to coordinate their actions with the corresponding DOD agencies takes four different actions or contacts, one to each of the DOD COCOMs responsible for parts of Eastern Africa and one to JTF HOA. Similarly, for a US military officer, assigned to CJTF HOA, to arrange country clearances into the CJTF AOR and surrounding areas, takes coordination with at least two different DOS bureaus. Further complicating the matters in this region is the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan where some two million refugees and internally displaced persons occupy camps spread between western Sudan and eastern Chad. As Chad is in the European Command (EUCOM) AOR and Sudan in the CENTCOM AOR, the potential for cross COCOM coordination exists. The solution to this intra-DOD problem has fallen to JTF HOA, which is responsible for coordination and country clearances for officials visiting this troubled area. When the effects of normal personnel turbulence and reassignment are taken into account, what remains is a system in which familiarity of action officers is limited and a coordinated approach seems difficult to conceive. This challenge is almost completely created by a lack of synchronization of executive department boundaries. It is inconceivable in the modern, internet fueled, twenty-four-hour cable news fed, satellite phone equipped world, to imagine a circumstance where either the US military or diplomatic corps could act in a vacuum. That all the actions of a nation are public, interrelated, and subject to intense scrutiny must be taken as axiomatic. Within this system, a coordinated approach to international operations is critical. The President and National Security Counsel (NSC) have attempted to improve the functioning of the system in recent years, with limited success. These attempts, usually via the Presidential Directive or National Security Directive system, have amounted to little more than stopgap measures addressing the symptoms of the current problem without addressing the greater illness. These "band-aids" have made those involved in their passage feel better, but have never attempted any systemic change designed to truly improve the functioning of the process. These attempts, and other more recent suggestions, will be discussed in greater depth later in the monograph, but their failure can commonly be related to one of a few issues. These issues will be compared in the monograph based on three criteria. The first criterion is feasibility, in terms of likelihood of acceptance or resistance by both decision makers and the affected agencies. The second criterion is cost, in terms of overhead for reorganization or creation of new organizations. The third criterion is timeliness, in terms of duration to receive concurrence from decision makers and time required to implement the solution.
Scope and Limitations
The challenge of interagency coordination is of great interest to the US government. No fewer than a dozen major studies are underway or have been completed relating to this most timely of issues. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is currently in its third complete volume of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols series relating to the challenges of Interagency coordination. As this monograph could not begin to cover the same breadth of information, a more focused approach must naturally follow. While nearly every major department of the US government has international dealings and must define the world in some way, this monograph will narrow the focus of analysis to the US Departments of Defense (DOD and State (DOS). These two organizations, more than any others, are the primary implementers of United States foreign policy, through either negotiations or agreements, or force if those efforts fail. Accepting the evaluation criteria listed above, many larger proposals for improving coordination become infeasible due to the extended time required for implementation, or the cultural resistance, or "pushback," expected within an organization. This monograph is focused specifically on the issue of interagency boundaries, their genesis, evolution and possible options for change within the existing system. Specifically, the efficiencies available to a more coordinated system, the ease by which a boundary change could occur, the advantages in facilitating larger, subsequent change and a suggestion as to how the harmonized international boundary system might look.
CHAPTER 1
The issue of multiorganizational synchronization is nothing new to the US government.
Following World War II the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47) reorganized the government to provide advice to decision makers and to develop policy for both long-and short-term contingencies, by subordinating all of the military services to a common civilian leader. This act was significant as there had never been a common superior to the War and Navy Departments, Joe, I don't give a damn about the Navy and you don't care a damn about the Army. You run your machine and I will run mine. I am glad if anyone can convince me I'm wrong, but I am damn sure nobody lives who can do it. I am an individualist and am not cut out for cooperative effort. I will let you go your way, and I will go my way.
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In this case, the leaders believed no change was possible because of the enormity of the problem, the lack of a clear way ahead, and the lack of a formal requirement from higher-level civilian leadership to integrate their actions. Despite the fact that this conversation took place over ninety years ago, it bears a startling resemblance to many of the arguments regarding the interaction of the executive departments of the US government. Even once the problem was engaged by General Marshall's proposal favoring a "single department of war in the post-war period" in 1943, it would take more than four years, two of them involved in a two theater war, to develop and pass directive legislation to address the problem of inter-service coordination. The inherent difference in transforming the Defense structure versus the executive departments presents the next major hurdle in the evolution of the government, particular the interagency process. That which differentiates the Service Members of the DOD from the other executive department employees is the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In the oath of enlistment or commissioning, a Service Member swears to "Obey the orders of the Officers appointed over me." He does not swear to do this most of the time, or when it suits him, and he certainly does not swear to stall until the current administration is voted out of power and new leadership is appointed. This is part of the problem faced when attempting to reform the bureaucratic systems of power resident within the US Government. This critical difference is lost on most outside observers when recommending changes to the interagency system to address some of the problems identified previously.
The current US government, faced with a similar two-theater engagement, has only started the process to integrate the actions of the executive departments. A solution is likely years, possibly decades, away from passage and decades further still away from full implementation.
What Has Already Been Proposed or Tried?
While no solution has yet to fall from the sky to correct the challenges of interagency coordination, several attempts have been made by various administrations and several other proposals have been posited by everyone from policy institute think tanks to SAMS students.
Three attempts or proposals will be considered for the purposes of this monograph; Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, and the "super executive agency" concept. Following a brief description, the causes of failure or components affecting effectiveness will be discussed.
PDD-56 was the Clinton administrations attempt to synchronize the interagency process.
Titled Managing Complex Contingency Operations it was
designed to ensure that the lessons learned --including proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms --will be incorporated into the interagency process on a regular basis. The PDD's intent is to establish these management practices to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. Dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes are needed. From our recent experiences, we have learned that these can help to:
• identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government agencies in a U.S. Government response;
• develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction;
• accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation;
• intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early on;
• integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level; and rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions
The PDD requires all agencies to review their legislative and budget authorities for supporting complex contingency operations and, where such authorities are inadequate to fund an agency's mission and operations in complex contingencies, propose legislative and budgetary solutions."
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Signed by the president in 1997, PDD-56 seems to be a large step in the right direction.
What it lacks, though, is tangible products and deadlines for implementation. It is, in effect, a "wish-list" for how an effective interagency process would run. A study conducted by A.B
Technologies some two years later found that "the spirit and intent of PDD-56 directed training is not being followed. No one has stepped forward in the leadership role." 8 PDD-56 failed to be fully successful because it was infeasible. The NSC was never designed to be a policy-making organization, with directive powers, rather, it has been a policy coordinating body, with resources and personnel dedicated to providing a shared environment where different executive departments and agencies can approach one another on common ground to synchronize their actions. The success of PDD-56 depended on the individual agencies to want to change and to act accordingly. Such behavior is not the natural way of things in the bureaucratic centers of the US government. Large parts of the entrenched bureaucracy in the government exist to ensure their continued existence. Any solution which fundamentally changed the status quo with regards to funding, manning, access to decision makers, or prestige could have been expected to be resisted by the established system. Attempting to solve the entire problem at once, with only a Presidential directive rather than formal legislative action, was a little like trying to kill a virus without antibiotics. While hope can improve your outlook, some actual medicine is probably required. The failure of PDD-56 strongly implies that those involved in the interagency process will not correct the problem themselves unless given a specific goal, and a legal requirement to achieve it. The creation of the DHS has also come with an annual price tag of $30 billion. This $30
billion is not to fund the actions of the twenty-two subordinate agencies, but simply to fund the reorganization and administrative costs involved in establishing and operating and executive department. These challenges are significant to the study of interagency coordination generally, and the super-agency plan specifically, because of the depth and breadth of change necessary. If the DHS cannot synchronize the efforts of twenty-two small federal agencies, none of which were previously designated as executive agencies in USC 5, toward a common goal then more sweeping reformation seems unlikely. One could assume a multiplicative effect from the amount of resistance and infighting generated by the small agencies absorbed by the DHS and level or resistance to be encountered when the Departments of State and Defense are told to report to a new boss, who is not the President. While clearly supported by US law, the size, scope, cost, and expected resistance of the super agency solution to the problem of interagency coordination render it infeasible.
What Is The Root Problem?
There is a common element to many of the unsuccessful solutions or suggestions to the problem of interagency coordination. Each of the previously discussed options involved significant change to the system. Each was sweeping in its scope and massive in its impact. Each of the solutions sought the kind of change that Goldwater-Nichols brought to the DOD.
Nevertheless, change on such a scale is not feasible without national motivation. It took the tragedy of the September 11th attacks to motivate the creation of the DHS, an organization still struggling to clearly define itself, and no such event has occurred to spur fundamental change to the executive departmental system.
Large bureaucratic organizations are notoriously unwilling to change, and will resist change as strongly as their position allows. This cultural resistance, or "pushback," can take many forms from passive to active. Given the highly transient nature of ruling parties and political appointees, relative to the lifespan of a career bureaucrat, resistance often takes the form of simple inaction. On the assumption that the leadership requiring the change will only be in charge for a limited time, the organization may seek to wait out the leader and reengage the status quo with the successor. If unabated, this method can progress almost indefinitely. Another method of pushback is to maintain cultural bias against the change. In the days immediately following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the DOD resisted the requirements to fully resource the Joint Staff by maintaining the cultural norm that characterized joint duty as undesirable. Further, Officers assigned to joint duty were seldom among the finest their respective services had to offer. By maintaining the anti-joint culture, the DOD was attempting to pushback against the Congress. This method has a tendency to fade over time, as those most resistant to change are phased out or retire. The most overt method of resistance to change generally involves a public airing of differences of opinion. The public statements of then Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger, decrying the need for any form of defense reorganization, let alone sweeping legislation, are an excellent example of public resistance to change. Some, or all, of these methods are common among large organizations resisting change.
It appears clear that interagency coordination will not be brought about in a single step.
To refer to a children's story, it seems that the elephant cannot be eaten in a single bite. A smaller, more timely, first step, seems to be the most viable option available. The successful option would have to be acceptable within the culture of an organization, feasible within the budgets of the organization and not so complex as to require excessive time to implement. Given their internally defined nature, the absence of change of scope of funding of the given organizations and ease of implementation, addressing interagency coordination by redefining the sub-departmental boundaries may well be that first step.
CHAPTER 2
What Are Boundaries And Why Do They Exist?
Before detailing the challenges and shortfalls inherent in the current system, a closer examination of how the individual departments arrived at their current position is important.
The The DOS Bureau design grew from similar models. The lacks of definitive information regarding the gradual changes to the DOS since its inception speak to the challenges inherent in transforming it. The State Department is a highly intellectual organization, populated with some of the best minds the country has to offer. annihilation based system, to one of politically driven, lower intensity wars amongst the people.
He believes that the new environment which nations exist requires a more integrated approach to the development of strategy. Specifically, he says:
Presently our institutions are structured like stovepipes, from the tactical to the strategic, and except in particular cases there is little interaction between them -a fact particularly evident when dealing with multinational organizations. We need to have the ability to bring them together, at least at the theatre level and probably lower, so that their actions are directed by one set of hands and their actions are coherent.
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Would Boundary Changes Really Help?
Outside of the purely academic debate over coordination and efficiency, the question of actual effectiveness remains unaddressed. Even if the changes are within the institutional tolerance of an organization, and are timely and cost efficient, if they do not accomplish the goal, the change is not worth executing. Clearly Mr. De Jarnette's beliefs demonstrate the frustration felt by many of the main players in the interagency system. As a result, an "all or nothing" mentality is prevalent within the system. Clearly any solution, short or long term, to the interagency coordination problem will have to have a directive element, but a solution which is acceptable to the affected organizations will require less legal "arm twisting." Here again, is a great value of boundary normalization.
Unlike more sweeping changes, which require time, money and large institutional acceptance, boundary normalization requires little more than organizations are already willing to do to themselves. Given the ability to change, it would seem that all that would be required is a neutral forum and process to determine the requirements of a harmonized system.
What Is The Problem Between Organizations?
The root of the problem is that each organization is free to review and implement these organizational divisions and does so independently of any other US government organization.
While Title 10, USC 161 requires an evaluation of the UCP "not less often than every two years,"
individual departments conduct major reviews of these boundaries at irregular intervals and usually only when forced by a change in internal or external conditions. The real problem is that the organizations themselves do not perceive a problem of coordination. Mr. DeJarnette defends the current system with the assertion that the DOD boundaries are different because the DOD has behavior of a successful participant was their systemic, rather than single aspect, approach to decision making. Dörner states, "It makes sense, then, to keep this aspect of complex systems in mind and to consider not just the primary goal of any given measure but also its potential effects on other sectors of the system." Similarly, the good participants focused their efforts and research on the causal links behind events as opposed to the unsuccessful ones, who tended to take things at face value without relation to one another.
Another critical observation made by Dörner was the level of reflection and selfcorrection made by successful and unsuccessful participants. Generally, the good participants were able to critically examine their own behavior over time, assess their strengths and weaknesses and select subsequent courses of action designed to reflect corrections. These deliberations never lost sight of the true goal. Conversely, the less successful participants tended to lack focus in their analysis, varying between insufficient depths of analysis to excessive depth in a very narrow field of consideration. What most unsuccessful participants had in common was the tendency to attempt to solve the problems they were able to solve rather than the problems they ought to be trying to solve.
This, then, is the heart of the interagency boundary problem. Since their inceptions, the different executive agencies have constructed their boundaries in an entirely stove piped manner.
The focus of the decision makers in an organization has been almost entirely internal, rather than systemic. Little thought has been given to the causal links between systems, rather than just within departments. Without coordination and synchronization of efforts, the actions of the various departments over time have had the exact opposite of the desired effect, complicating, rather than synchronizing, international policy efforts.
Turning A Weakness Into Strength?
The characteristics which have complicated the system provide the method for its synchronization. As detailed earlier, organizations can "pushback" against changes they perceive as too extreme or as detrimental to the survival or prestige of the organization. For change to be successful it should be of the type which inflames as few of the institutional norms as possible.
Boundary changes could fit this profile for the simple reason that they already change. and homeland security issues desired by USNORTHCOM. Again, this decision was met with no collective angst, as there was no threat perceived to the organization. In this idea of acceptable internal change lies the method for the first step in interagency coordination. It could be possible to coordinate the geographical definitions of the executive departments using existing mechanisms, which are perceived as unthreatening by the organizations themselves, without the "pushback" experienced in earlier attempts to change the system. This realization is the heart of the boundary argument.
For the coordination to be effectively implemented, however, great care must be given to the forum used to discuss these changes and the specific actor tasked to implement them. There must exist, among all those involved, the reasonable expectation of fair treatment and unbiased decision making. Only in a neutral arena could executive departments submit themselves to the external process of coordination. Such an organization already exists in the US government's national security architecture, the National Security Counsel.
NSPD-1 establishes the National Security Counsel (NSC) to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.
The President has directed the NSC to:
advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States -domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics. The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.
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Given this, the NSC seems the proper vehicle to coordinate the normalization of executive department boundaries. The NSC has several subcomponents. A principals committee, made up of the primary decision makers (the actual Secretaries of State, Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and others), a deputies committee, made up of the principal deputies to the above decision makers, and policy coordination committees, where the actual work is done. Specifically NSPD-1 directs that:
Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each NSC/PCC shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC/DC. . . . The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Vice President and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, may establish additional NSC/PCCs as appropriate.
22
The NSC PCC would appear to be the correct method by which departmental boundary normalization could be accomplished. A PCC would be established by Presidential directive which would engage the issue of executive department boundaries and the various agencies 21 National Security Counsel, National Security Presidential Directive 1, Organization of the National Security Council System (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2001), 2-4. 22 Ibid.
would contribute representatives to create the recommendation, which would then be submitted to the higher, decision making, committees.
According to the fifth edition of American National Security, the NSC is, in practice, a venue to correlate cross-boundary issues and keep all departments informed of significant issues that might affect more than one agency. Each president uses NSC differently, as can be seen in the different executive directions (NSPDs, PDDs, and others) that govern interagency cooperation through NSC. Under its current formulation, the NSC is organized along regional and functional lines (see NSPD-1). This organization does not "match" any government agency organization precisely; rather it reflects "clusters" of US interests. Bureaucratically, it allows NSC to remain above the fray, showing no preference to one department over another in how it is organized. The current NSC functional organization follows the geographic "cluster" principle, and allows room for ad-hoc "sub-PCC" meetings to address emerging issues."
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Clearly then, the NSC is the proper vehicle for change. It meets all the above criteria as a neutral place for coordination, and possesses the required power to organize and implement the change decisions reached within.
Why Has This Not Already Been Done?
If the evolution of the asynchrony in boundaries was subtle, and the solution is acceptable within the institutional culture of the organizations involved, it begs the question; why has this not already happened. Often a solution can seem so obvious, very little thought is given to its actual implementation. The best national security policy is integrated -diplomatically, economically, culturally and militarily. Realigning the geographic responsibilities of the DOD regional combatant commands and the DOS political affairs bureaus to match up theater level actors more closely is a first step toward achieving the required integration.
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In the CSIS Beyond Goldwater Nichols II study, recommends a similar approach, as part of a larger strategy. The issue of boundary normalization, though, only gets a single line entry as a final recommendation. It is the only one of the dozens of recommendations lacking a multiple page explanation and gets only one paragraph out of 156 pages. CSIS concluded that the government should establish a common framework for defining the regions of the world.
The NSC should lead an interagency review of how various agencies divide the world into regions for the purposes of policy execution, with the aim of creating a common regional framework that could be used across the U.S. government. The resulting framework should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis to ensure it adapts to changes in the international security environment.
25
It is clear that the idea of boundary normalization is not new. Where this monograph differs from many of the previous recommendations, though, is that while boundary revision is normally offered as part of a larger plan, it is proposed as a stand-alone measure. Again, this could mitigate the amount of institutional resistance any reformation might encounter, while actually imposing substantive change on the system. In the absence of such advocates as Goldwater and Nichols, the interagency process seems unlikely to change.
Despite the lack of a sponsor, it is the sincere belief of the author that boundary normalization offers the best first step. The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and synchronization of all activities conducted by an Executive Department in pursuit of National goals and objectives.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Policy
The United States must synchronize the actions taken abroad across the range of departments and instruments of national power. The policies developed toward a region must reflect a similar focus and unity of effort. The United States must insure the maximum use of options and resources are brought to bear on the problems facing the world and this is not possible in an environment where departments work at cross-purposes. This synchronization will enable the executive departments of the US Government to maximize the efficiency of effort of the personnel tasked with developing and implementing the policies of this nation.
Need for Coordinated U.S. Efforts. To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct diplomacy and related activities in a range of situations that require the response 27 National Security Counsel, National Security Presidential Directive 44, 12.
capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.
Coordination. The National Security Counsel Staff shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct reorganization activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.
Responsibilities of the Department of State
To achieve the objectives of this Directive, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the following functions:
1. Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reorganization efforts for those states and regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate;
2. Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations;
3. When necessary, identify appropriate issues for resolution or action through the NSC interagency process in accordance with NSPD-1.
Responsibilities of the Department of Defense
1. Provide United States Government decision makers with detailed options for an integrated United States Government response in connection with specific reorganization operations including to recommend when to establish a limited-time sub-PCC-level group to focus on a country or region facing major reorganization challenges; 2. Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations;
Responsibilities of other Executive Departments and Agencies
To enable the execution of this directive and to activities and requirements with necessary resources, Executive Departments and Agencies whose programs and personnel may be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges will: Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or other mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be re-designated as transitions are required.
Policy Coordination Committee I hereby establish a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Executive Department Boundary Normalization (EDPN PCC). The PCC will be chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and a designated member of the NSC staff. The PCC shall include representatives in accordance with NSPD-1.
Nothing in this directive shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals.
[signed:] George W. Bush
Were such efforts ever to be undertaken by the US government, an NSPD would only be the first step. Time limitations tied to funding, regular updates to the deputies committee, and legislative oversight would all be required to ensure the organizations involved did not attempt some form of pushback, in an attempt to delay reorganization until calls for reform has subsided.
Additionally, as public scrutiny increases pressure for success, the media should be involved in the announcement of the new organizational plan.
Ultimately, this proposal to reorganize the executive department boundaries meet the earlier established criteria of feasibility, cost, and acceptability. The proposal is feasible. Nothing prevents reorganization of the executive departments; in fact, the departments reorganize themselves regularly. The cost of the proposal would be minimal. No new headquarters or major bureaus would be created and the total migration of responsibility from one region to another is no significant. The proposal could be acceptable. As stated earlier, the true strength of the reorganization model comes in its execution within existing acceptable practices.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the challenge of interagency coordination is one of the most compelling of this era. It requires the honest, forthright efforts of all the elements of national power, applied across the full spectrum of diplomacy and conflict. As it currently exists, the interagency coordination system is stove-piped and resistant to change. The inefficiencies resident in the system threaten the effectiveness of the entire national security and foreign policy establishment.
These organizations are exclusively internally focused in their approach to operations across the world and habitually fail to coordinate with their executive department peers. Clearly, sweeping change is needed, but sweeping change is not easy. By their nature, the large bureaucracies of the executive departments are resistant to change and seek to defend their own position and resources from any outside influences. Previous attempts to reform the interagency system have met with failure because their scope was too large; the solution was so unacceptable to those involved that the entire organization resisted the decision, or the associated costs in new organizations or structures was too great. Any solution to the challenges of interagency coordination will have to be feasible, in terms of likelihood of acceptance or resistance by both decision makers and the affected agencies, cost effective, in terms of overhead for reorganization or creation of new organizations, and timely, in terms of duration to receive concurrence from decision makers and time required to implement the solution. A modest first step must be identified which meets all these criteria. The normalization of executive department boundaries can be that first step.
The boundaries the executive departments use to define their world wide operations are internally established and managed. These boundaries change as often as the leadership of the organization sees fit to do so. To change these boundaries to a single, national, standard would not engender the ire or resistance from an organization likely from more drastic changes. Rather, the change would be in the same vein as normal operations within the organization. Similarly, a boundary shift would have little associated cost. No new organizations would be created and no new resources would be required to implement the change. Any personnel shifts which would result from reassignment of a country from one sub organization to another would be minor and could be accomplished through the cycle of natural attrition within an organization. Above all, a boundary shift would be timely. This process could begin with the stroke of the Presidential pen.
No lengthy Congressional hearings or interagency wrangling would be required before beginning work. The establishment of a temporary policy coordination committee within the NSC would allow the process to be accomplished through existing structures and with existing personnel.
Boundary normalization would also serve to remove many of the incongruities between the executive departments. As of January 2007, the DOD is the only executive department without a dedicated sub-organization for Africa. While that appears to be changing, this is a condition which has existed for decades. Additionally, DOD is the only executive department which places India and Pakistan in different regions. To separate the policy formulation for this region seems destined to fail. While the DOD officials who developed the UCP claim good reasons for this organization, their place as the only federal organization to do so calls into question the validity of their assumptions.
A normalized system would be more effective and more efficient. It would allow action officers of numerous organizations to develop a habitual relationship and, through that, increased trust in the other. True interagency coordination is not likely to be enforced from without, but is more likely to develop from within. A normalized system allows these relationships to begin.
